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Aesthetic Regulation: State n: Jones
I. INTRODUCTION
A growing number of American communities have become con-
cerned about the negative effect automobile junkyards, garish signs.
and similar land uses have on the appearance of their urban and rural
landscapes. Frequently. however, a community's desire to do some-
thing about these problems is blunted by assertions that the police
power cannot properly be applied to achieve aesthetic objectives. For
many years, the majority view in America and the view in North Caro-
lina has been that the police power may not be used to further aesthetic
interests.' Recently, however, a number of states have held aesthetics
to be a valid regulatory interest.2
In State r. Jones3 the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized aes-
thetics as a valid basis for the exercise of the police power.4 Jones over-
ruled the court's previous cases including State v. Brown' to the extent
that these previous cases prohibited aesthetic considerations, either
alone or in combination with other interests, as a basis for governmen-
tal regulation.6 Prior to Jones, aesthetic considerations had. except for
the limited area of historic district regulations,7 either been left out of
regulations, stated in regulations as inconspicuously as possible without
justification,' or included in regulations under the guise of recognized
interests such as public safety or protection of property values.'
I Bufford. Bevnd the Eve of the Beholder: .4 ,*ew" .tfajortti ofJurt.rdut'titns .4uthorte- .4e.-
thetic Restalaton. 48 UMKC L. Rv. 125. 126 11980).
2 Id at 127
3 305 NoC. 520. 290 S.E.2d 675 (1982).
4 Id at 530. 290 S.E.2d at 681.
5 250 N C. 54. 108 S.E.2d 74 (1959).
6 State v. Jones. 305 N.C. 520. 530. 290 S.E.2d 675. 681 (192).
7 See A-S-P Assocs. v. City of Raleigh. 298 N.C. 207. 258 S.E.2d 444 (1979).
8 For example. consider subdivision regulations requiring side lot lines to be perpendicular
to the street right-of-way and regulations requiring a minimum width or frontage for residential
lots. Although not stated, these requirements and others contained in subdivision ordinances arc
often motivated by aesthetic concerns. See generally Annot.. 21 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1968) under
"frontage requirements" and "width and area of lots.*"
9. See State v. Vestal 281 N.C. 517. 189 S.E.2d 152 (1972). where a screening requirement's
stated purpose was to insure community safety and acceptability, but the court stated that "we see
no reasonable basis for supposing that the construction of such a fence along the boundary of the
automobile wrecking yard will promote safety on the adjacent roads." Id at 523. 189 S.E.2d at
156
1
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The recognition in Jones of aesthetics as a valid regulatory interest
provides needed support for existing aesthetically oriented regulations
and provides the basis for certain aesthetic regulations which could not
have been adopted in the past because their objectives were either
purely or primarily aesthetic. In addition. Jones provides a test for de-
termining the validity of aesthetic regulations.' 0 The application of this
test in future litigation will establish the limits within which aesthetic
objectives can be pursued. While case law applying the Jones test is
limited. ' an analysis of the test itself along with an examination of case
law in other majority jurisdictions suggests some of the contours of this
area of the law. This note explores some of the implications of the
Jones decision by examining the reasonableness test set forth in the
opinion. An analytical framework within which aesthetic regulation
cases may be more clearly understood and compared is also outlined
and is applied to Jones. This framework permits the validity of aes-
thetic regulations to be more accurately predicted. In addition, the
framework reveals the relatively benign nature of most aesthetic regu-
lations thus dispelling, to some degree, the apprehension that has
tended to surround this aspect of the law.
II. THE CASE
On July 29. 1980. the defendant. Mack H. Jones. was charged with a
violation of Buncombe County Ordinance Number 16401 as
amended.' 2 This states, in part. that "[jiunkyards or automobile grave-
yards may be operated and/or maintained without restrictions if and
providing that said junkyard or automobile graveyard shall be entirely
surrounded by a fence, or by a wire fence and vegetation .... ""3 The
defendant failed to erect the required fence to enclose his junkyard,
known as Mack's Used Car and Truck Parts, from the adjacent resi-
dential area.' 4 The defendant moved to quash the warrant on the
grounds that the ordinance was unconstitutional as written and as ap-
plied, and that the enactment and enforcement of the ordinance was
outside the county's statutory authority.' The district court granted the
10 State v Jones. 305 NC 520. 530. 290 S.E.2d 675. 681 (1982). See infra text acconipan -
ing notes 48-55
II See R 0 Givens. Inc. v. Town of Nags hlead. - N.C. App. -. 294 S E.2d 389. 391
11982) (citing Jones)
12. Plaintiff-Appcllant's Brief at 2. State v Jones. 53 N.C. App. 466. 281 S.E.2d 91 (1911).
aff'd. 305 N.C. 520. 290 S.E.2d 675 (1982).
13. Record at 10. State v. Jones. 53 N.C. App. 466. 281 S.E.2d 91 (1981). aui'd. 305 N.C. 520.
290 S E.2d 675 (1982).
14 Plaintiff-App llant's Brief at 2. State v Jones. 53 N.C App. 4t6. 281 S E.2d 91 (198I).
aJy'd. 305 NC 520. 290 S.E.2d 675 (1982)
15 Record at 3. State v. Jones. 53 N.C App. 466. 281 S. E.2d 91(198h1). ald. 305 NC. 520.
29) S E.2d 675 (1982).
2
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 [1983], Art. 13
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol14/iss1/13
AESTHETIC REGUILA TION
defendant's motion to quash the warrant after finding the ordinance
unconstitutional.' 6 The State of North Carolina appealed the district
court's decision to the superior court which upheld the lower court's
finding.' The State appealed again to the Court of Appeals of North
Carolina. 8 The court of appeals examined the recent holdings of the
North Carolina Supreme Court on the subject of aesthetic regulation
and reversed and remanded after concluding that "the trend in the
cases decided by our Supreme Court is such that Brown no longer gov-
ems." 9  The defendant then petitioned the Supreme Court of North
Carolina for discretionary review from the judgment of the court of
appeals.2 The supreme court specifically overruled Sae . Brown.
finding the ordinance constitutional and held "that reasonable regula-
tion based on aesthetic considerations may constitute a valid basis for
the exercise of the police power depending on the facts and circum-
stances of each case."
21
III. BACKGROUND
The 1959 decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court in State r.
Brown established the rule in North Carolina that aesthetic considera-
tions alone were insufficient to support the use of the police power.22 In
Brown, the court held a state statute requiring the screening of certain
junkyards unconstitutional because it was based upon aesthetic
grounds.2' The court commented:
We are in sympathy with every legitimate effort to make our high-
ways attractive and to keep them clean; even so, we know of no author-
ity that vests our courts with the power to uphold a statute or regulation
based purely on aesthetic grounds without any real or substantial rela-
tion to the public health, safety or morals, or the general welfare.
2 4
16 Id
17 Id
IX. Id
19. State v Jones. 53 N.C. App. 466.470-71. 281 S.E.2d 91.94 (1981). adjld. 305 N C. 520. 29()
S.E.2d 675 (1982).
20. Petition for Discretionary Review Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-3 1. State v. Jones. 305
N C 520. 290 S E.2d 675 (1982).
21 State v. Jones. 305 N.C. 520. 530-31. 290 S.E.2d 675. 681 (1982).
22. State v. Brown. 250 N.C. 54. 59. 108 S.E.2d 74. 78 (1959). Prior to Brown. the North
Carolina Supreme Court indicated. in Turner v. City of New Bern. 187 N.C. 541. 543-47. 122 S.E
469. 470-73 (1924). thai aesthetic considerations could be a proper motive for the enactment of
municipal regulations. However. such aesthetic objectives had to be combined with other consid-
erations more closely related to the police power. If they were not so combined, the aesthetic
regulation could be sustained only if compensation was provided under the right of eminent do-
main. Also. in Hinshaw v. Mclver. 244 N.C. 256.259.93 S.E.2d 90.92 (1956). the North Carolina
Supreme Court recognized the statutory power of a municipality to regulate the operation of junk
yards. This case. however, did not consider the issue of aesthetics.
23. 250 N.C. at 59. 108 S.E.2d at 78.
24. Id.
3
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This view was reiterated in two subsequent cases: Little Pep Delonico
Restaurant. Inc. s. Cin of Charlote 25 and Horton Y. Gulledge.' In Del-
monico Restaurant, the court said that "[ilf it appears the ordinance is
arbitrary. discriminatory, and based solely on aesthetic considerations.
the court will not hesitate to declare the ordinance invalid." -7  The
court's opinion in Horton recognized the United States Supreme
Court's comment in Berman . Parker28 that "[i]t is within the power of
the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as
well as healthy. sFacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as care-
fully patrolled."2  However, the Horton opinion went on to say that:
[A] decision of the Supreme Court of the United States construing the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution. though persuasive by reason of our respect for the views of
that Court. does not control our interpretation of the Law of the Land
Clause in the Constitution of North Carolina.30
The first suggestion of a possible change in the 1959 rule came in
State r. Vestal3 when the court again considered the constitutionality
of a regulation requiring the screening of auto wrecking yards and
other similar uses. The Vestal court found the ordinance unconstitu-
tionally vague, and stated that it could not find a reasonable basis for
assuming that the screening requirement would promote the alleged
purpose of highway safety. 3" Since the screening requirement was
presented to the court as having the singular objective of highway
safety. the question of aesthetics as a possible basis was not before the
court."3 Despite the absence of the issue of aesthetics, the Vestal court
went on to comment that -iwe express no opinion [on the validity of a
requirement based upon aesthetic considerations alone], though we
note the growing body of authority in other jurisdictions to the effect
25 252 N C 324. 113 S E.2d 422 (1160) (ordinance prohibiting business signs ier ,ide-
26 277 N (* 353. 177 S E.2d 885 j 1970) dllousing Commission order requiring demolition ol
i d,,cllingl (stating that -%e have held that even the State. itself. may not. under the guise of the
police ptwer. regulate the use of property for aesthetic reasons which have no real or substanital
relation to the public health, safety or morals, or to the general welfare."). Id at 359. 177 S E 2d
at 889
27 252 N C at 326. 113 S.E.2d at 424
2h 348 U S. 26 (1954).
29 Id at 33.
30. 277 N.C. at 359. 177 S.E.2d at 889. The "law of the land clause" in the Constitution of
North Carolina reads as follows:
No person shall be taken. imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or
outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life. liberty, or property. but by the law
cif the land. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws: nor shall any person
be subjected to discrimination by the State because of race. color, religion, or nattonal origin.
N C (o',.sT. art. I. § 19.
31 2XI N C. 517. 189 S.E.2d 152 (1972)
32 Id at 521-23. 189 S.E.2d at 156.
33 Id at 524. 189 S.E.2d at 157.
4
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 [1983], Art. 13
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol14/iss1/13
AESTHETIC REGULA TION
that the police power may be broad enough to include reasonable regu-
lation of property use for aesthetic reasons only.'
Between the North Carolina Supreme Court's consideration of Ves-
tal in 1972 and its consideration in 1979 ofA-S-P Associates . Citr of
Raleigh. 3 the majority rule in the United States on aesthetic regulation
changed.36 The former majority rule that aesthetic interests alone
could not support an exercise of the police power became the minority
rule.3" As in Vestal, the court's opinion in A-S-PAssociates noted this
growing body of authority in other jurisdictions recognizing the valid-
ity of aesthetic considerations as a basis for use of the police power.-"
This time, however, the court held "that the police power encompasses
the right to control the exterior appearance of private property when
the object of such control is the preservation of the State's legacy of
historically significant structures.131 While aesthetics was recognized
as a valid interest, the historic district regulations were not upheld on
this basis alone. Other legitimate interests such as the preservation of
the historic and cultural heritage of the community for educational
purposes were significant in justifying the use of the police power."'
The A-S-PAssociates opinion is important because it outlines a test for
determining the validity of a governmental regulation of private prop-
erty when the regulation is challenged on the ground that it is an inva-
lid exercise of the police power." This test was later adopted by the
court within the broader context of State r. Jones.'2 Soon after.4-S-P
,4ssociates. the Court of Appeals of North Carolina, in Countr of Cum-n-
berland v. Eastern Federal Corporation,3 held that the Cumberland
Count sign ordinance could properly be based upon aesthetic con-
cerns. When the Court of Appeals of North Carolina considered
State v. Jones4 one year later, the court commented that -[w]e do not
believe we can affirm the superior court in the case sub judice consist-
ently with Cumberland County." ' 6 The court went on to say that "[wle
believe the trend in the cases decided by our Supreme Court is such
that Brown no longer governs."' 7
34 Id
35 298 N C 207. 258 S.E.2d 444 (1979).
36 Bufford. supra note I. at 127.
37. Id.
38. A-S-P Asoc. v City of Raleigh. 298 N.C. 207. 216. 258 S.E.2d 444. 450 (1979)
39 Id
40. Id
41. Id at 214. 258 S.E.2d at 448-49.
42. State v. Jones. 305 N.C. 520. 530. 290 S.E.2d 675. 681 (1982).
43. 48 N.C. App. 518. 269 S.E.2d 672 (1980).
44. Id at 524. 269 S.E.2d at 676.
45. 53 N.C. App. 466. 281 S.E.2d 91 (1981). afl'd. 305 N.C. 520. 290 S.E.2d 675 (1981).
46. Id at 470. 281 S.E.2d at 94.
47 Id at 470-71. 281 S.E.2d at 94.
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IV. ANALYSIS
In analyzing State r. Jones, this note first examines the reasonable-
ness test set forth in the opinion. Following this, a framework within
which aesthetic regulation cases may be compared is outlined. The
Jones case is analyzed in relation to this framework, and in relation to
other aesthetic regulation cases which, according to the analytical
framework, are either similar to or different from Jones.
A. The Reasonableness Test
In State r. Jones the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized aes-
thetic considerations as a valid basis for exercise of the police power
subject to the test set forth inA-S-PAssociats.4" In describing the test.
the Jones court said "[w]e do not grant blanket approval of all regula-
tory schemes based upon aesthetic considerations. Rather. we adopt
the test expressed in A-S-P Associates that the diminution in value of
an individual's property should be balanced against the corresponding
gain to the public from such regulation.""' The court identified factors
to be considered in applying the test. These factors include private
concerns such as confiscation of all or part of the value of the property
and depriving the property owner of the reasonable use of thz or, "erty.
and public concerns such as the regulation's purpose and the manner in
which the purpose sought is to be achieved.5
In order to understand the Jones test. it is useful to refer to the man-
ner in which the test was outlined in A-S-P Associates:
Several principles must be borne in mind when considering a due
process challenge to governmental regulation of private property on
grounds that it is an invalid exercise of the police power. First. is the
object of the legislation within the scope of the police power? Second.
considering all the surrounding circumstances and particular facts of
the case is the means by which the governmental entity has chosen to
regulate reasonable? ...This second inquiry is two-pronged: (1) Is
the statute in its application reasonably necessary to promote the ac-
complishment of a public good and (2) is the interference with the own-
er's right to use his property as he deems appropriate reasonable in
degree?5'
For regulations based on aesthetics. State v. Jones eliminates future
48. State v. Jones. 305 N.C. 520. 530. 290 S.E.2d 675. 681 (198l2).
49. /d
50. IM The court also listed a number of corollary community benefits which would be fac-
tors to be entered into the balancing equation. These factors include "the protection of property
values, promotion of tourism. indirect protection of health and safety. preservation of the charac-
ter and integrity of the community. and promotion of the comfort, happiness, and emotional sta-
bility of area reidcnts- Id
S1. A-S-P Assocs. v. City of Raleigh. 298 N.C. 207. 214. 258 S.E.2d 444. 448-49 (1979).
6
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concern about the first part of theA-S-PAssociates test since the Jones
opinion expressly recognizes that aesthetics is within the scope of the
police power.5 " The ,econd part of theA-S-PAssociates test, consisting
of a two-pronged test of reasonableness, remains therefore as the essen-
tial part of the test adopted by Jones.
The first prong of the reasonableness test examines the means se-
lected to implement the regulation's objective. The application of this
prong of the test is illustrated in A-S-P Associates where the court
found that the historic district regulations were "the only feasible man-
ner in which the historic aspects of the entire district can be main-
tained.""3 The second prong of the reasonableness test consists of the
balancing of the diminution in value of the owner's property against
the public concerns. In applying this portion of the test, the court in ,4-
S-P Associates found it significant that the ordinance did not prohibit
the construction of new structures but only regulated the manner in
which they were to be constructed. 4 The court further noted that "the
mere fact that an ordinance results in the depreciation of the value to
an individual's property or restricts to a certain degree the right to de-
velop it as he deems appropriate is not sufficient reason to render the
ordinance invalid.""
It is helpful to observe that the A-S-P test closely parallels the classic
test for constitutional due process first enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court in Lawton v. Steele"' and revived in Goldblatt v. Town
of Hempstead.' Lawton held that, first it must appear "that the inter-
ests of the public . . . require such interference; and, second, that the
means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose,
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals."5" A review of the litera-
ture discussing the Lawton test is useful in identifying the constitutional
issues shared by the two tests by virtue of their similarity."9
I. Implications of the Reasonableness Test
While the diminution in value prong of the test in Jones provides a
useful framework within which to consider conflicting interests, the in-
ability to quantify aesthetic objectives and the existence of differing
52 305 N.C at 530. 290 S.E.2d at 681.
53. 298 N.C. at 217. 258 S.E.2d at 450-51.
54. Id at 218. 258 S.E.2d at 451.
55. Id
56. 152 U.S. 133. 137 (1894).
57. 369 U.S. 590. 594-95 (1962).
58. 152 U.S. at 137.
59. See generall. I A. RA1II KOPF & D. RATIIKOPF. Tim LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING
§ 201 14th cd. 1983): J. NOWAK. R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG. HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 443-44 (1978); D. MANDELt.KR. LAND Usk LAW 22 (1982).
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opinions leaves doubt that the test will in and of itself resolve the diffi-
cult questions inherent in the area of aesthetic regulation. Even in the
non-aesthetic areas of land use law the adequacy of the diminution in
value test has been questioned.'
In some cases, such as A-S-P Associates (upholding historic district
regulations), the reasonableness test illuminates the legal questions and
aids in a clear articulation of the reasoning supporting the holding."t
In another group of cases, exemplified by States v. Jones (upholding
screening requirements for junkyards), the test again provides a useful
methodology for dealing with the conflicting interests. The application
of the test, however, offers little in the way of a rationale to support
what is basically an obvious result once it has been determined that
aesthetics is a proper basis for regulation and that junkyards are offen-
sive. In other words, the test provides little help in making the determi-
nation that junkyards are the sort of thing that warrant appearance-
oriented regulations. This latter group of cases is characterized by the
fact that there is a commonly held opinion that the use is visually offen-
sive. This public perception is generally accepted by the court, as it
was in Jones. and is sometimes reinforced by referring to the use as a
nuisance."2 While Jones sets forth the test for determining the validity
of aesthetic regulations, the supreme court opinion gives little attention
to the application of the test to the facts of that particular case. The
requirements of the test, however, are met. The required screening
does effectively lessen the offensive nature of the use, and the cost of
the screen and the percentage of the land required to accommodate it
appear to be reasonable in relation to the public benefit."3 A third
group of cases represents the situation where the basis for comparing or
weighing the conflicting interests cannot be identified. These cases are
characterized by the fact that: (I) more abstract aesthetic principles or
objectives are the subject of regulation; and (2) there is less unanimity
as to the wisdom of the legislative undertaking. Examples include
cases involving: (i) decisions of architectural controi boards estab-
lished to approve the design of dwellings within residential neighbor-
60. See generalli Sax. Taktng.r and the Police Power. 74 YAI.E U. 36 (1964). Michclman.
ProPert." Uthir. and Farness." Comments on the Ethicat Foundations of 'Ju.st C "ompen.ration "" Law.
80 iIARv L Ri.v 1165 119671; Department of Eculogy v. Pace.setter Const.. 89 Wash 2d 203. 571
P2d 196 (1977).
61. See 298 N.C. at 216-18. 258 S.E.2d at 450-51.
62. 3 P. RoLIAN. ZoNI G AND LAND Us. CONTROLS § 16.03. at 16-26 (1982).
o3. When the Court of Appeals of North Carolina considered Jones. reference was made to a
balancing of the public and private interests. The court said "'lIln reaching this conclusion. we
take into account that the duty on the defendant to build a fence or grow a hedge is not tooX
burdensome as compared to the public bcnefit to Buncombe County in improving the appearance
of the highways." State v. Jones. 53 N.C. App. -.66. 470. 281 SE.2d 91.94 (1981). ay/'d. 305 N C
520. 290 S.E.2d 675 (19821
8
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hoods.6 4 (2) regulations totally excluding mobile home parks from the
list of permitted land uses; 5 and (3) regulations excluding cemeteries
from certain areas.6 It is precisely these cases that reveal the limita-
tions of the reasonableness test in resolving the conflicting issues."?
The reasonableness test therefore appears to vary in its ability to con-
tribute to the actual formulation of the judicial opinion. In some cases.
such as A-S-P Associates, the test is helpful in illuminating the issues.
In another set of cases, such as Jones, the determination that the use
warrants regulation is more likely attributed to public perception than
legal analysis. The test in these cases, however, can be useful in deter-
mining whether the private landowner is unreasonably burdened. The
third situation is where the interests are so subjective that they elude
application within a balancing test.
2. Other Factors Influencing Reasonableness
The concern that aesthetic matters were not capable of being evalu-
ated according to objective standards was one factor underlying the
early rejection of aesthetics as a proper basis for exercising the police
power." In certain areas of aesthetic regulation such as historic dis-
tricts. it is particularly important for standards to be adopted." Gener-
ally the greater the discretion available to the administrators, the more
advisable it is to develop standards. An issue related to the matter of
standards is the question of who will make the judgments necessary to
administer the regulation. Again, in the area of historic district regula-
tion. where the amount of discretion is relatively broad, the State of
North Carolina requires that a majority of the members of the Com-
mission demonstrate special interest, experience or education in history
or architecture."' Similar considerations are advisable for other situa-
tions in which considerable discretion must be exercised. Where there
64 .YSeeeneral.r E. YoKt.iy. ZONIN; LAW ANt) PRACTIC §4-7 at 186 (4th ed. 1978).
05 V. e"g.enerallr Annul.. 42 A.L.R.3d 598 (1972).
66 .V'eegenerallr Annot.. 96 A.L.R.3d 921 (1979).
67 rhc dilerence between the scond and third categories (see text accompanying notes 61-
661 Is that the second includes uses generally recognized and reasonably considered to constitute a
noancc. l:or uses in the third category. however, the unfavorable perception of the use'is not as
uniformly shared. and the opinion is less objectively based. For example, while many communi-
ute% exclude mobile homes from their zoning jurisdiction for appearance reasons, it is difficult to
•upport classtlicatton of this form of housing as a nuisance---especially given the growing need to
rel) on mobile homes as a form of shelter.
68 3 P. ROIIAN, .upra note 62. at 16-28: P. GREEN. JR.. CAStS ANt) MATr:RIAI.S ON PtA.N
.%-.m, LAW AMt) ADMINISTRATION ch. 14. at 14-15 (1962).
69. See A-S-P Assocs. v. City of Raleigh. 298 N.C. 207. 258 S.E.2d 444 (1979) where the court
stated that "tihe architectural guidelines and design standards incorporated into the Oakwood
ordinance . provtde an analysis of the structural elements of the different style-% and provides
additional ,upport for our conclusion that the contextual standard of 'incongruity* is a sullicient
limitation on the Ilistoric District Commission's discretion.- Id at 223. 258 S.E.2d at 454.
711 N.( GIN. StAT. § 160A-396 (1982). The Supreme Court of North Carolina discussed
9
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is no discretion, such as where there is total prohibition of a use with-
out exception, there is little need for either standards or aesthetic
expertise.
B. Analyzing Aesthetic Regulation Cases
1. Cases.According to Asserted State Interest and Jurisdictional
Approach
One obvious and important distinction to make in analyzing an aes-
thetic regulation case is to determine whether the regulation is founded
on aesthetic considerations alone or aesthetics in combination with
other interests which have been recognized by the courts as valid bases
for the use of the police power.7 It is necessary to then determine
whether the jurisdiction recognizes aesthetics alone as a valid basis for
the exercise of the police power, recognizes aesthetics as a legitimate
interest only when combined with other police power interests, does not
recognize aesthetics in any form, or has yet to determine the validity of
aesthetic regulation." For example. in State r. Jones. had the regula-
tion simply required a fence to be built around the junkyard, the regu-
lation could have been successfully upheld on the basis of public safety
without raising the question of aesthetics. However, it was the ordi-
nance's requirement that the fence or fence in combination with land-
scaping screen the contents of the junkyard from the view from an
adjoining public right-of-way that raised the issue of aesthetics." Since
the visual screening function of the fence requirement could only be
justified as an aesthetic consideration, the court was impelled to ex-
amine one of the aesthetic concerns closest to the category of nui-
sance-junkyards-under a rule formulated in Brown which gave no
weight at all to aesthetic considerations. It is clear therefore that either
the ordinance or the former rule had to yield and. as reflected in the
Jones opinion, the court adopted the view that aesthetics alone was
sufficient for the exercise of the police power.
Compare the opinion adopted by the court in Jones. which recog-
nized'aesthetics alone as a valid interest, to the other alternatives noted
above. The court could have adopted the view that aesthetics is a valid
interest when combined with other recognized bases for the exercise of
the police power. This view is more supportive of aesthetic regulation
than Brown but is not as broad as Jones. However, had this view been
the requirements or this statute in A-S-P Associates v. City of Raleigh. 298 N.C. 207. 223. 258
S E.2d 444. 454 (1979).
71. Annot.. 21 A.L.R.3d 1222. 1225-26 (1968).
72 See generaltv Bufford. supra note I. at 130.
73. The rcquircments of the Buncombe County Ordinance arc set out in the Jone.r opinion
State v. Jones. 305 N.C. 520. 521-22. 290 S.E.2d 675. 676-77 11982)
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adopted, the court could not have upheld the Buncombe County ordi-
nance without finding that screening the contents of the junkyard from
the view of the public right-of-way somehow achieved some valid eco-
nomic objective such as protection of property values or protection of
local tourism. Alternatively, the court could have chosen to continue to
recognize aesthetics as a valid exercise of the police power on a cate-
gory-by-category basis continuing the approach taken by the court in
A-S-P Associates and County of Cumberland.74 The fact that the court
chose the aesthetics alone approach in State v. Jones appears to indi-
cate the court's support for the interests achieved by reasonable aes-
thetic regulations.
2. Cases According to Category
A second approach to analyzing aesthetic regulation cases is to un-
derstand the case in relation to certain generally accepted categories.'
The validity of this approach is based upon each category tending to
possess common "bundles" of aesthetic and non-aesthetic interests.
For example, historic district regulation cases are generally similar in
their common concern with cultural and educational interests."h These
two interests are generally absent from screening and fencing cases.77
The Jones case falls within the category of screening requirements and
more specifically screening requirements for a land use that approaches
classification as a nuisance. As noted in the previous section, the public
interests in Jones, at least by implication, include aesthetics (the con-
cern for the appearance of the area), public safety (keeping the public.
especially children, out of the junkyards)." and protecting the value of
surrounding property. On the other side of the equation, the property
owner's concerns include the cost and maintenance of the screening
and the loss of any land area needed to accommodate the screening
especially where landscaping and buffer strips are required. The "bun-
dle of interests" identified above in Jones are as a general rule also
found in other screening cases. This tendency of categories to share
common interests should provide a useful means of predicting the out-
come of a case especially when the cases are further distinguished ac-
cording to the asserted interests and the rule of the jurisdiction as
discussed in the previous section.
74. See infra text accompanying notes 43-47.
75. See generalhy Annor.. 21 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1968) for an overview of some categories.
76. See infra text accompanying note 40.
77 See generaly Annot.. I A.L.R.4th 373 (1980).
78 The requirement of a solid screen a_ opposed to a wire fence, however. is related to the
acsthetic interest. See infra text accompanying note 73.
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3. Cases According to Aesthetic Concern
A third method of analyzing aesthetic regulation cases is according
to the regulation's aesthetic concern or objective. Artistically, these
aesthetic concerns are generally referred to as scale, style. unity, har-
mony, rhythm, proportion, sequence and composition."9 From a math-
ematical point of view, these concerns can be understood according to
the concepts of number, type, and relation.80 For purposes of analyz-
ing aesthetic regulation cases, the artistic and mathematical approaches
can be merged into three categories.
The first category of cases represents a quantitative concern or con-
cern with magnitude and includes within it the artistic concept of scale.
For example, billboard regulations generally attempt to reduce the
magnitude of the visual impact such uses have on the viewer or, in
other words, reduce their visual dominance on the landscape. This
magnitude of visual impact can be reduced by minimum spacing re-
quirements between billboards, limitations on their size, or by a total
prohibition of the use. Each of these regulatory techniques achieves
the aesthetic objective of reducing the visual impact of billboards-a
use which has often been identified as visually offensive. It follows
then that by reducing the visual impact of billboards, an area becomes
more visually pleasing. In State v. Jones, the regulation being chal-
lenged attempted to reduce the magnitude of the junkyard's visible im-
pact by screening the use from the view of the general public. Just as in
the billboard example, the aesthetic objective in Jones could have been
approached through other methods such as placing a maximum land
area limitation on the use, adopting minimum spacing requirements
between junkyards (although this technique is probably not appropri-
ate in the case ofjunkyards) or prohibiting junkyards entirely. Each of
these techniques represents an approach to achieving the same aes-
thetic objective, i.e., reducing the magnitude of the visual impact junk-
yards have on the environment.
The above analysis is useful in determining whether the regulation
meets the first part of the reasonableness test set forth in A-S-P Associ-
ates. i.e., whether the statute in its application is "'. . . reasonably nec-
essary to promote the accomplishment of a public good."' In Jones
the screening requirement is reasonably necessary because it is one of
79. See generally E. RASKIN. ARCHITECTUrALLY SPEAKINO (1966).
80. See generally L. voN BFRTALANFFY. GENERAL SYSTEMS TEORY (1968). in dealing
with complexes of'lcements' three different kinds of distinction may be made-i.e.. I. according
to their number; 2. according to their species; 3. according to the relations of the elements.' Id at
54.
81. A-S-P Assocs. v. City of Raleigh. 298 N.C. 207. 214. 258 S.E.2d 444. 449 (1979).
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the few effective alternatives which can be applied to an existing use
without placing a serious burden on the property owner.
State Y. Jones then falls within this first category of aesthetic concern,
i.e., reducing the magnitude of the visual impact junkyards have on the
landscape. After examining the remaining two categories, it will be
seen that the first category, which deals with quantity, is the least per-
plexing. This is because it generally deals with instances in which a use
has been identified by a community as being visually undesirable and
regulations have been adopted to abate the magnitude of its visual im-
pact.5 2 Therefore, aesthetic regulation cases falling within this first cate-
gory should in general be upheld by the court, provided the techniques
employed are reasonable. However, the result may be less clear when
the regulatory technique used to decrease the magnitude of the visual
impact is total prohibition. 3 Where the use does not serve a necessary
function within the community or can be achieved by other means, to-
tal prohibition may be appropriate. Where the use serves some "im-
portant" purpose, however, total prohibition may be too strong a
technique. In these cases a more appropriate regulatory approach may
be to allow the use within the community and minimize its adverse
visual impact through one or more less restrictive techniques.
Other examples falling within this first category of aesthetic concern
include People v. Stover 4 (upholding an ordinance prohibiting the
placing of clotheslines in any yards which abut a street). Oregon Cihr v
Harike " (sustaining a zoning ordinance provision prohibiting automo-
bile wrecking yards within a city), People v. Goodman"6 (upholding an
ordinance limiting commercial signs to a maximum area of four square
feet). Livingston .' Marchev17 (upholding an ordinance prohibiting any
trailer or camp car from being parked on any street or on any premises
within the town except for purposes of repair or storage within a build-
ing). and People v. Berlin' (sustaining a zoning ordinance regulation
limiting hedges and fences to a maximum height of six feet along rear
property lines)."9
The remaining two categories, which will now be identified as the
second and third categories of aesthetic concerns are not directly rele-
82. Seetifia text accompanying note 62.
83. See State v. Jones. 53 N.C. App. 466. 281 S.E.2d 91 (1981). alfd. 305 N.C. 520. 290
S.E.2d 675 (19821. "if the automobile graveyard had been forbidden at this location. linstead of
requiring it to be screened] we might have reached a different result." Id at 470. 281 S.E.2d at 94.
84. 12 N.Y.2d 462. 191 N.E.2d 272. 240 N.Y.S.2d 734. appeal dirmissed. 375 U.S. 42 (1963).
85 240 Or. 35. 400 P.2d 255 (1965).
X6 31 N.Y.2d 252. 290 N.E.2d 139. 338 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1972).
87 85 N J. Super. 428. 205 A.2d 65 (1964).
88 62 Nfisc. 2d 272. 307 N.Y.S.2d 96 (1970).
89. In each of these cases, note that the aesthetic objective is concerned with reducing the
magnitude of a use which has been determined to have undesirable visual attributes.
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vant to the Jones case. However. each category will be described
briefly to give additional perspective to illustrate how the aesthetic ob-
jective in Jones compares to the objectives in the other categories of
cases.
The second category entails quality rather than quantity or magni-
tude. The category includes the aesthetic concepts of style and har-
mony. and many of the cases pertain to regulations seeking either
sameness or differentiation. Examples of cases within this category of
aesthetic concern include State eor, rel Saieland Park Holding Corp. 1.
Jieland" (upholding a zoning ordinance regulation making issuance
of a building permit conditional upon a finding that the exterior ap-
pearance and plan of a proposed structure not be so at variance with
existing structures as to cause a substantial reduction in property val-
ues), State e. rel StoranojI'" v Berkley'" (sustaining an ordinance
which allowed an architectural board to deny issuance of a building
permit to construct a pyramid-shaped residence with triangular win-
dows within a neighborhood consisting of conventional residences).
Reid r. Architeciural Bd of Ret'iew z (upholding the disapproval of a
permit to construct a contemporary residence within a residential area
consisting of stately traditional homes), and A-S-P Asociates v. Cir of
Raleigh 3 (upholding the creation of a historic district). Each of the
above cases pertains to a qualitative as opposed to a quantitative aes-
thetic concern. Since quality is a subjective determination, the resolu-
tion of legal issues within this second category of aesthetic concern
should in general prove to be somewhat more difficult and less predict-
able than in the first category. One exception to this is the area of his-
toric district regulation where the existence of cultural. educational and
aesthetic interests provides strong support for the style-oriented
regulations.
The third category. perhaps the most abstract of the three categories.
focuses on relationships. This category includes the artistic concepts of
sequence. rhythm and composition and has two applications. The first
application includes concern about the spatial relationship of buildings,
or other objects, to one another. For example, some historic district
ordinances not only attempt to maintain the style of architecture within
an area (which would come within the second category of quality, dis-
cussed above) but seek to maintain the relationship of buildings to one
another-such as their spacing along the street. Another example of
the first application of this category is the design of the highway land-
911 269 Wis. 262.69 N.W2d 217 (1955)
91 358 S W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970).
92. 119 Ohio App. 67. 192 N.E.2d 74 (1963).
93 298 N C. 207. 258 S.E.2d 444 (1979)
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scape.14 The second application is represented by a regulation requir-
ing the approval of a building's exterior design, not in relation to its
harmony or lack thereof with the surrounding buildings (which would
come within the second category of quality) but as an artistic composi-
tion in and of itself."5 It is this application of the third category that
most strongly embodies the fears of those courts which have concluded
that aesthetics is too subjective an interest to justify use of the police
power.' This latter example could be further complicated by first
amendment freedom of expression questions."7
The above analysis of cases according to aesthetic concerns reveals
that most litigation has been within the first two categories dealing with
magnitude and quality. These categories for the most part do not in-
volve overwhelming aesthetically-based philosophical questions but
present questions no more difficult than those arising in other areas of
litigation. It is only the third category that embodies difficult aesthetic
questions and, until more regulations in this category are adopted.
there is little to fear in the further evolution and propagation of aes-
thetic regulations.
V. CONCLUSION
"he opinion in Staei r. Jones gives relatively strong support to aes-
thetic regulation efforts in North Carolina. The opinion will have its
greatest impact in those areas of aesthetic regulation which are purely
or principally aesthetic in their objectives. Included in this category are
entranceway ordinances"" and other special appearance districts.""
Jones will also give important support to those regulations already on
44 Ilor an example of how these aesthetic concepts are applied to highway landscapes. %cc 1).
A'I I lS AIi. K I.Y% It J %I 1 k. rilL. VII-% I HM 1 Ii R siI) ( l9-Si
' Within the third category. the lirst application ,iesempliticd b sotme historic district rcgu-
latiows and the dcsign of the highway landscape) refers to the land use's relationship to things
tither than itelf The things surrounding the particular use and the particular use itselfare seen as
an artitic composition within which the use must spatiall conform. The conformity desired.
how,.cr. refer% to the use fitting into the artistic composition. e.g.. concern with sequence and
rh% thm. and not simply achieving sameness which falls within the second category. i.e.. quaiy or
s)le In the second application, the use is being regulated as an artisttc composition in and of
itself rhe concept if r'altonship comes in here because in order to evaluate a use as an artistic
composition, the relationship of its elements must he examined. e .. solids related to voids. and
one shape related to another.
96 See. eg.. Youngstown v. Kahn Bros Bldg. Co.. 112 Ohio St. 654. 148 N.L. 842 (1925).
97. For example. an architect might argue that a community's regulations infringe upon his
right to express himself creatively.
98 An cntranceway ordinance is a set of regulations designed to achieve ae-thetic objectives
along the major thoroughfares leading into a community. A principal reason behind the ordi-
nance is that visitors generally r-ceive their first impression of a community along these
entranccways.
99 A special appearance district is a geographical area within which a set of acsthctic-or-
ented regulations is being administered. A historic district is a form of special appearance district
A community may want to create a special appearance district in an area lacking historic qualities
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the books which have aesthetics as their unstated objective. In addi-
tion. the Jones opinion may be significant in encouraging communities
to adopt a bolder attitude toward aesthetic regulation.
ARTHUR L. BERGER
In thica'c. trong suppon for aesthctc regulatlon i%. nccdcd sincc the hi.storic prcscrvation justali-
cution for the di.trict is not available.
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